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JUSTICE GODFREY AND THE RULES:
PROCEDURE AS SUBSTANCE
L. Kinvin Wroth*
Godfrey has always preferred to get to the substance of things.
Thus only about ten percent of his Law Court opinions can be classi-
fied as "procedural," and in that limited selection of his judicial
work product there are few lengthy discourses expounding the pur-
poses and policies of the Rules of Civil Procedure for their own
sake. Rather, Godfrey's opinions reflect the reasonable view that
procedure is meant to serve a larger end-the attainment of a just
resolution of the dispute before the court. Yet, as he wrote recently
in these pages, achieving that end
requires, among many other things, that there be impartial
tribunals, accessible to all, for fairly and promptly resolving
disputes based on claims of right and for carrying out the re-
sulting resolutions ....
.. . Regardless of the substantive justice of the laws, it
seems fairly certain that a breakdown of institutional arrange-
ments for deciding disputes and carrying out judicial decisions
would lead to grave social disorder; widespread despair of get-
ting institutional justice would lead to epidemic civil violence.'
In other words, the integrity and consistent operation of the judicial
institution, including the rules by which it operates, must be main-
tained if the courts are to serve their intended public function.
These seemingly disparate attitudes mean that Godfrey's proce-
dural opinions are a continuing tight-wire act in which the balance
between the need to achieve an individually and socially fair and
wise outcome and the need for integrity in the operation of the sys-
tem are precariously maintained. This balancing act may be seen in
three types of cases: those in which busy trial judges who have
failed to understand and apply the rules are gently corrected; those
in which a rule or procedural statute with some measure of elasticity
is stretched to assure, or to prevent appellate frustration of, a fair
outcome; and those in which a lawyer's sins, whether of omission or
commission, may be visited upon an unlucky client.
In some cases in the first category, the correction of judicial error
was for the purpose of protecting the Law Court from the perils of
improvident decision. Thus, in Giles v. Maine Fidelity Life Ins. Co.,
the report of a question of law under Rule 72 of the Maine Rules of
* Professor and former Dean, University of Maine School of Law; A.B., Yale
University, LL.B. Harvard University.
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Civil Procedure was discharged. The action was a claim for damages
against a disability insurer for nonpayment of benefits under a pol-
icy issued in connection with the installment purchase of a new truck
repossessed by the seller. Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint
to include a demand for punitive damages was denied because the
original claim did not sound in tort. Three years later, on the eve of
trial, the plaintiff moved under Rule 72(c) for report of that ruling
to the Law Court. While that motion was pending, the parties
agreed to a dismissal of all claims except the potential claim for pu-
nitive damages. The trial judge then reported the case.
Justice Godfrey treated the report as made under Rule 72(a),
which permits a report by agreement where a dispositive question of
law is of sufficient importance or doubt to justify the report.3 In
interpreting this provision, he applied the standard developed under
the parallel Rule of Criminal Procedure, that the question must be
one of both importance and doubt.4 In reporting the action the trial
court had found only that the matter was "of sufficient doubt."'
Noting that the question of the availability of punitive damages in
such a case might be both doubtful and important in the abstract,
Justice Godfrey concluded that the issue must be of importance to
the parties in the resolution of the particular controversy as well.
"Otherwise, the report would amount to little more than a request
for an advisory opinion."6 In this case there was no finding of the
requisite concrete importance by the trial judge and its presence on
the record was doubtful given the parties' settlement of all other
claims. Moreover, the confused procedural circumstances of the
stipulated dismissal raised serious questions as to whether a decision
of the case "would be consistent with Court's basic function as an
appellate tribunal."7
In other instances Justice Godfrey's judicial corrections were
aimed at procedural errors at trial. For example, in Cyr v. Cyr' the
trial judge, after granting custody of two minor children to the wife,
denied the husband's request for specific findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, particularly as to the reasons for selecting the wife as
3. ld. at 475 (citing ME. R. Civ. P. 72(a)).
4. i at 475 (citing State v. Plazcek, 380 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Me. 1977) (construing
the identical language of ME. R. CRIM. P. 37A(a))). The Criminal Rule was
amended, effective April 16, 1979, to conform to the decision in Plazcek by substi-
tuting "and" for "or." See Order of March 21, 1979, and Advisory Committee's
Note, Me. Rptr., 396-400 A.2d XXXIX, XLIII, LII (1979). A comparable amend-
ment has not been made to ME. R. Civ. P. 72(a).
5. Giles v. Maine Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 402 A.2d at 475.
6. Id
7. Id (quoting State v. Foley, 366 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1976)). See also
Winchenbach v. Steak House, Inc., 430 A.2d 45 (Me. 1981) (Godfrey, J.) (report
discharged where amount of settlement depended on how Law Court ruled on re-
ported question and "procedural anomalies" left issue presented in doubt).
8. 432 A.2d 793 (Me. 1981).
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the custodial parent. The judge had asserted that his order con-
tained sufficient findings, but Justice Godfrey noted that there was
no consideration of "the critical finding in a custody decision"-
whether the choice was in the best interests of the children.' This
finding was critical for two reasons that spoke with special force in
custody cases. A finding is essential for effective appellate review,
because independent review by the Law Court is particularly inap-
propriate given the difficult choice that most cases present between
two equally fit parents. "To choose the greater of two goods is ad-
mittedly no easier than to identify the lesser of two evils. Neverthe-
less, the judge is obliged to make the choice"'" in furtherance of the
best interests of the child. Secondly, findings are essential to the
determination of subsequent modification proceedings, serving "a
critical function as the bench-mark from which later change in cir-
cumstances may be measured."" Justice Godfrey concluded that
the record must show that the trial judge considered the factors per-
taining to best interest and that there must be "sufficient factual
findings in the custody order to allow the appellate court to deter-
mine the grounds for the justice's decision and whether that decision
was supported by competent evidence."' 2 The case was accordingly
remanded for entry of specific findings and conclusions based on
any further proceedings deemed necessary to assure that the find-
ings were current. 13
In a second group of decisions Justice Godfrey cut through proce-
dural barriers to assure a fair outcome. In Reynolds v. Hooper,'
4
after judgment for the defendants on a referee's report, the plaintiffs
failed to file a timely notice of appeal but filed a motion under Rule
73(a) for an extension of the appeal period on grounds of excusable
neglect. After the motion had been noticed for hearing, but before
the hearing date, the trial judge granted the motion. Four days later
he retired from the bench. The plaintiffs then filed a notice of ap-
peal from the original judgment. A second judge held a hearing on
the defendants' Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the first judge's order
and on the plaintiffs' original motion. The second judge granted the
defendants' motion, denied the plaintiffs' motion, and dismissed
their notice of appeal. On appeal to the Law Court, Justice Godfrey
9. Id. at 795-96.
10. Id. at 796.
11. Id. at 797.
12. Id.
13. I. at 797, 799. See also Merrill v. Merrill, 449 A.2d 1120 (Me. 1982) (neither
marital property statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 721,722-A, 752 (West 1981
& Supp. 1994) nor ME. FL Civ. P. 60(b) permits divorce court to modify original
division of marital property); Knowlton v. Rhodes, 413 A.2d 546 (Me. 1980) (after
grant of post-judgment motion to amend complaint to conform to evidence, trial
court ordered entry of second judgment in same amount as original judgment;
docket would be corrected to reflect that original entry was sole judgment).
14. 407 A2d 312 (Me. 1979).
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treated the hearing before the second judge as having been con-
ducted pursuant to Rule 63, which provides for disability of a judge.
While noting that a successor judge does not ordinarily have power
to set aside orders of a predecessor, Justice Godfrey concluded that
such a power does exist "when unusual circumstances indicate that
an injustice would otherwise result. 15 Finding that failure to hold a
hearing constituted such a circumstance, he upheld the second
judge's order that set the first order aside.16
Bowman v. Dussault,"7 an automobile passenger's negligence ac-
tion for personal injury, raised issues in the tangled area of prejudg-
ment attachment procedure. At the commencement of her action
for $256,000 in damages, plaintiff sought a real estate attachment in
the amount of $100,000. After a hearing, the Superior Court ap-
proved the attachment on the basis of the pleadings and the parties'
affidavits as to liability and damages. Justice Godfrey held that the
trial judge's finding of a "reasonable likelihood" of recovery as re-
quired by Rule 4A was not clearly erroneous in light of the specific
facts pleaded and set forth in the affidavits. He nevertheless ruled
that the attachment was invalid because the affidavits as to the
amount of damages claimed did not meet the requirement of speci-
ficity set forth in Rule 4A(h). Because "prejudgment attachment
may operate harshly on the party against whom it is sought," it was
not sufficient that the plaintiff's injuries be described in general and
subjective terms. To support her claim that her career as a model
and dance instructor was impaired by her injuries, the plaintiff
should have offered "photographs or at least particular descriptions
of her injuries and scars and statements from which some informed
projection could be made" as to lost earnings.'
In Akins v. Firstbank, N.A.' 9 the beneficiary of a testamentary
trust sued the trustee for an allegedly fraudulent sale of assets occur-
ring while she was a minor. The sale had been approved in probate
court without notice to her or her guardian. The superior court
treated the complaint as a probate appeal and dismissed it as barred
by the one-year statute of limitations for such appeals that raised
defects of notice.20 Reading the complaint as alleging a cause of
action for fraud and nondisclosure, however, Justice Godfrey held
15. Id. at 313.
16. Id at 314.
17. 425 A.2d 1325 (Me. 1981).
18. Id at 1329. The Law Court recently distinguished Bowman in Jacques v.
Brown, 609 A.2d 290,292 (Me. 1991), holding that such specificity was not required
where the claimed injuries were "mental and emotional flowing from unlawful sex-
ual attacks upon her." The court did not have to determine whether the change in
1992 of the Rule 4A standard to "more likely than not" affected the nature of the
showing required. Id at 292 n.2.
19. 415 A.2d 567 (Me. 1980).
20. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 403 (West 1979).
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that it was governed by the six-year discovery statute of limitations
applicable to such actions.' Finding that the statute of limitations
issue could not be determined on the face of the pleadings, he va-
cated the judgment of dismissal.'
In the third category of decisions-those involving errors by law-
yers who should have known better-Justice Godfrey tended to in-
sist upon strict compliance with the Rules. This tendency appears
most clearly in cases where the lawyer's own interests were directly
affected. Thus, in Bramson v. Richardson'3 the plaintiff, a lawyer
representing himself in a forcible entry and detainer action, sought
money damages, rather than possession, in the complaint. Justice
Godfrey held that the defendant's appeal from the grant of sum-
mary judgment "for plaintiff as prayed for" must be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction because no valid judgment had been entered.
The entry of judgment on the docket did not specify the relief to be
awarded and thus did not satisfy the requirement of Rule 79(a) that
the notation indicate the nature and substance of the judgment"
The case could not merely be remanded for entry of a proper judg-
ment, however, because there were two further problems. The only
remedy available under the statutory forcible entry and detainer ac-
tion was possession. 5 Hence the grant of summary judgment for
the relief prayed for was an improper disposition of the motion.
More important, the plaintiff's purported affidavit on which the
grant of summary judgment was based was not sworn and, in any
event, taken with the pleadings, did not rebut the equitable defense
offered by the defendants in an affidavit that was also unsworn. 6
The opinion does not determine the effect of these considerations,
but concludes, "[W]e merely observe that if the issues that seem to
be involved in this case are ever properly litigated to a valid judg-
ment, the decision of the Superior Court should be supported by
careful analysis as a basis for appellate review."'27
21. Akins v. Firstbank, N.A., 415 A2d at 569 (citing ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 859 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994-1995)).
22. Id. See also Ireland v. Galen, 401 A.2d 1002 (Me. 1979) (request for produc-
tion in conjunction with motion for support arrearages held effective though served
prior to valid service of motion because court had continuing jurisdiction of divorce
proceedings); Nisbet v. Faunce, 432 A.2d 779 (Me. 1981) (client's petition for fee
arbitration under ME. BAR R 9 could be withdrawn despite incorporation in Bar
Rule of Uniform Arbitration Act provision that arbitration agreement is irrevoca-
ble; to hold otherwise would defeat purpose of rule to encourage informal resolution
of fee disputes).
23. 412 A.2d 381 (Me. 1980).
24. Id at 382-83. See ME. R. Crv. P. 79(a).
25. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6006 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994-1995).
26. Bramson v. Richardson, 412 A.2d at 383-84.
27. Id. at 384.
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In re Dineen28 was an information brought in the Law Court by
the Attorney General for discipline of an attorney. On appeal from
the order of a single justice suspending him from practice for four
months, appellant challenged the refusal of the justice to dismiss one
count of the information that appellant claimed involved unresolved
legal issues in an action then on appeal to the Law Court. Appel-
lant, after judgment and while the appeal was pending in that action,
had seized assets of the defendant under a writ of attachment issued
nearly a year earlier. Although Rule 4A required that any attach-
ment must be made within thirty days of the order approving it, ap-
pellant acted on the basis of his "good faith belief and 'feeling'"
that Rule 62(f), providing for the continuance of an attachment dur-
ing the pendency of an appeal, authorized his action.29 Justice God-
frey adopted the ruling of the single justice that the text of the rule,
the Reporter's Notes, and subsequent commentary "delineate in
language clear beyond any possibility of reasonable doubt" that
Rule 62(f) served only to continue existing valid attachments pend-
ing appeal. °
In other cases the same insistence on strict application of the rules
had the immediate effect of forcing the client to suffer the conse-
quences of a lawyer's procedural error. Reynolds v. Hooper,3 1 dis-
cussed earlier, illustrates this point. Plaintiffs' counsel had originally
stated in his motion to extend the time for appeal, and had testified
at the hearing on the motion, that the failure to file the appeal was
the result of various problems in communicating with his clients,
who resided in England. In the brief on appeal, however, counsel
stated that the failure was occasioned by a miscalculation of the ap-
peal period. Rejecting the contention that any of these circum-
stances constituted "excusable neglect" under Rule 73(a), Justice
Godfrey looked to the identical language in the federal rule on
which the Maine rule was based and to the strict view of the Federal
Advisory Committee that an extension on this ground should be
granted "only in extraordinary cases where injustice would other-
wise result."'32 Federal cases holding that neither communication
difficulties with mobile clients nor failure to note the running of the
time for appeal constituted "excusable neglect" supported his ruling
sustaining the second judge's rejection of plaintiff's motion for ex-
tension of the appeal period. 33 The clients thus lost their opportu-
nity to appeal.
28. 380 A.2d 603 (Me. 1977).
29. Id. at 605.
30. Id
31. 407 A.2d 312 (Me. 1979). See also Cyr v. Cyr, 432 A.2d 793, 797 (Me. 1981).
32. Reynolds v. Hooper, 407 A.2d at 314 (citing Federal Advisory Committee's
Note to 1966 amendment of former FED. R. Cv. P. 73(a)).
33. I. at 314 (citing Winchell v. Lortscher, 377 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1967) and
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Connor, 382 F.2d 13, 16-17 (10th Cir. 1967)).
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In Peaslee v. Pedco, Inc.' involving an even more egregious lapse
by counsel, the impact again fell on the client. In proceedings
before a referee, appellant's counsel had requested a continuance
based on the absence of a material witness without offering a sup-
porting affidavit. Counsel then did not appear either to argue for
the continuance or to present appellant's case on the merits. Find-
ing that counsel had notice of the date of the hearing, Justice God-
frey upheld the Superior Court's acceptance of the referee's report
favorable to appellee, despite appellant's claims that holding the
hearing without counsel present was both constitutional and proce-
dural error.35
Similarly, in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Hadley,36 counsel for appel-
lant, not having caught up with an amendment to the appellate pro-
visions of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure adopted more than a
year earlier, filed the "Designation of Contents of Record on Ap-
peal" required by the former rule, rather than the order for tran-
script, statement of issues, and record appendix as required by
amended Rules 74 and 74C. Rule 73(a) required dismissal of the
appeal for failure of timely compliance with these requirements, un-
less the Law Court found that failure was excused by "exceptional
circumstances." Justice Godfrey ruled:
Appellant in this case has not only failed to take many steps
within the time prescribed, he has failed to take the steps en-
tirely.... There being no exceptional circumstances to excuse
this failure to perfect the appeal by compliance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure, we must dismiss the appeal.3 7
In a sharp dissent in Martel v. Inhabitants of Town of Old Orchard
Beach,38 Justice Godfrey chastised his own colleagues for a decision
that seemed too forgiving of a lapse by counsel. Plaintiff had sued
the York County resort town for an injury allegedly caused by a
highway defect. Suit was brought in Androscoggin County, where
she resided, in reliance on the general venue statute, which was ap-
plicable to actions under the Maine Tort Claims Act.39 Her counsel
overlooked a section of that Act saving the provisions of other
waiver of immunity statutes, which included a separate provision for
highway defect actions against a town.40 The statutory venue for
such actions was limited to the county where the town was located.'
34. 388 A2d 103 (Me. 1978).
35. Id. at 105-06.
36. 413 A.2d 934 (Me. 1980).
37. Id. Former ME. R. Civ. P. 73(a), without the "exceptional circumstances"
provision, is now found in ME. K Civ. P. 73(g).
38. 404 A2d 994, 999 (Me. 1979).
39. Id.; Mn. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8101-8118 (West 1980).
40. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tiL 14, § 8113(2) (West 1980). See ME. Rn",. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 3655 (West 1992).
41. ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 505 (West 1980).
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When the town moved for dismissal on the ground of improper
venue, the trial court ordered the motions granted unless plaintiff
moved to transfer venue to York County within ten days.42 Instead
of taking up that offer, plaintiff appealed from the resulting final
judgment. The majority of the Law Court, noting that Maine statu-
tory provisions concerning transfer of venue were at best incom-
plete, held by analogy to the statutory change of venue provisions in
force in most states that the superior court in such a case should
exercise its inherent common law power to transfer the action to the
proper venue automatically if the interests of justice so required.43
Justice Godfrey, in dissent, pointed out that the superior court
gave plaintiff an opportunity to change venue, and she did not
avail herself of it. Plaintiff has offered no excuse for her fail-
ure to act.... I do not understand why that was not an en-
tirely correct way of handling the problem in view of the fact
that our rules and statutes provide no express mechanism to
effect transfer of venue.44
The results in these cases seem to have a harsh impact on the
client, who suffers substantial detriment as a result of a lawyer's
technical error. Such a result, however, reflects two legitimate pol-
icy considerations. The first is that, in the moral free market, hold-
ing individuals accountable for the results of their freely made
choices is a reasonable working proposition. The client is bound by
the results of his or her chosen instrumentality. The second consid-
eration is that the ultimate effect of such decisions is to render law-
yers accountable for their errors. Whether simply as a matter of
exposure and chastisement before bench and bar or through the
sanctions of malpractice liability or professional discipline for in-
competence, the lawyer who has erred is the ultimate recipient of
the court's message. Relaxation of the rules for the sake of the cli-
ent's immediate interest would let the lawyer off the hook.
Justice Godfrey, in another of his rare dissents, recognized limits
to the notion that considerations of personal responsibility and pro-
fessional competence demand strict accountability for procedural
error. In Laurel Bank and Trust Co. v. Burns4" he took his col-
leagues to task for insisting on a strict application of Rule 60(b) in a
case involving lawyer error. The issue arose in a suit by the bank
against three defendants to recover $50,000 due under a chattel se-
curity agreement and for conversion of the goods. While the civil
42. Martel v. Inhabitants of Old Orchard Beach, 404 A.2d at 995-96.
43. Id. at 997-98.
44. Id at 999. See also Cates v. Farrington, 423 A.2d 539 (Me. 1980) (failure of
represented party to request electronic recording of District Court trial precluded
appellate review of denial of motions for new trial and other relief under Rule 59, as
well as of the merits; with no verbatim record, appellant did not meet burden of
showing prejudicial error).
45. 398 A.2d 41, 45-49 (Me. 1979).
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action was pending, two of the defendants were convicted of crimi-
nal charges arising out of the same situation. In the criminal pro-
ceeding one of the defendants was represented by the same lawyer
who represented all three defendants in the civil action. More than
two years after it was commenced, the civil action was placed on a
trial list. The bank then initiated settlement negotiations with the
attorney, which resulted in entry of a judgment of $50,000 against all
three defendants. Several months later, defendant Bums, the mem-
ber of the trio who had escaped criminal prosecution, moved to
have the judgment against him vacated on the grounds that it was
entered as a result of the lawyer's mistake, inadvertence, or excusa-
ble neglect. In fact, the lawyer admitted that he had "forgotten"
that Burns was a party. On appeal the majority of the Law Court
upheld the trial court's denial of the motion. The court first held
that Bums could not raise the lawyer's lack of express authority be-
cause he had not presented that ground to the trial court. Holding
that, whether the lawyer's error was mistake or neglect, the movant
had the burden of showing that the action was excusable, the court
found that in the circumstances there was no basis for saying that
the lawyer, who had participated in various pretrial proceedings and
had signed the agreement for the docket entry, had engaged in ex-
cusable conduct.
Justice Godfrey's dissent explored authorities interpreting Federal
Rule 60(b), upon which the Maine rule was based, and noted factors
that had sustained findings that neglect was "excusable," emphasiz-
ing particularly that this judgment had been entered without any
examination of the merits of plaintiff's claim, including the amount
of actual damages. He pointed out the anomaly that, if Burns had
been defaulted, Rule 55(b) would permit him to be heard on the
amount of damages. The conclusive argument was that
[i]t is unconscionable to permit the appellee bank to execute
on a $50,000 judgment inadvertently confessed, where there
has been no inquiry whatever into the nature or amount of the
injury, if any, sustained by the appellee as a result of appel-
lant's attorney's careless act. Justice clearly required that ap-
pellant's motion be granted in order that the merits of the case
could be heard and determined.$
Thus, even the need to enforce individual responsibility and profes-
sional integrity must give way in a situation where strict construction
of the rules would result in an unconscionable windfall for a third
party.
Taken together, Godfrey's procedural decisions suggest an effort
to strike a balance in the doing of justice that accords with a more
fundamental ethical position that he recently expressed. Professing
admiration-"up to a point"-for Nietzsche's efforts to find a hu-
46. Id. at 49.
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manistic basis that would foster "virtues like magnanimity, creativ-
ity, and leadership," Godfrey turned for a more practical rule of
conduct to the Confucian precept, "Do not do to others what you do
not like yourself." Godfrey's balance of firmness and flexibility is
reflected in his conclusion: "If Nietzsche will let me tag along with
Confucius from here on, I can get along with Nietzsche."' 7
47. Edward S. Godfrey, Getting Along with Nietzchse, Address Before the Uni-
versity of Maine School of Law Alumni Annual Dinner (Nov. 6, 1993), in J. ME.
LAW SCH. ALUMNI QUARTERLY No. 50, Winter 1993.
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